Also: Longer A New Chapter The Long Tail of Marketing
Anderson's book is a decade old, just in time to enjoy a wave of people saying, hey, that turned out to be All Wrong. Guess what? The people saying that have an idea of what is in this book that maps very poorly to what I read in this book. Anderson has seen plenty of it, and part of the last section or so is devoted to, here are the ways that people tend to misunderstand what I am saying.
Here are some samples of Long Tail Is Wrong:
This is actually the one that convinced me to finally read the book. I had figured, when it was originally published, that I never needed to read it, because I understood how it worked, having been on a rocket launched by the long tail since the Spring of 1996. There wasn't really anything in the book that surprised me.
Shatzkin points to very self-serving piece by a digital small publisher that argues that the long tail doesn't pay because their catalog sells a few things really really well and everything else barely moves if at all. Which is actually what the long tail predicts, so you sort of have to wonder whether we read the same book.
Shatzkin also points to a piece of data from the Canadian book market which, if true, is sort of interesting. It doesn't prove anything wrong about Anderson however. (Anderson never said you couldn't find where the tail went to zero -- he just noted that it wasn't showing up yet. Perhaps Canadian book production has found the intersection of the tail with zero.)
Here is another instance of Blockbusters vs. Long Tail, with the rhetorical frame that these two somehow don't fit together.
Let's go straight to Anderson for why this frame is wrong.
"By far the most common misperception is that the Long Tail predicts the end of hits. Not so. Hits are as much a part of a powerlaw distribution as are niches. What's dead is the monopoly [he emphasizes] of the hit." And by monopoly, he means that in the Bad Old World, the powerlaw distribution got chopped off unnaturally. Now, it is not chopped off, and Clever People and Companies can make money off the long tail, where there is lots of stuff to be moved and lots of money to be made, if you can solve the signal to noise issues. "For too long hits or products intended to be hits have had the stage to themselves, because only hit-centric companies had access to the retail channel, and the retail channel only had room for bestsellers. But now blockbusters must share the stage with a million niche products, and this will lead to a very different marketplace. Let me explain."
"There are essentially three kinds of hits." Basically, real ones selected by gatekeepers, fake ones pushed by gatekeepers ("think Garfield: A Tail of Two Kitties") and bottom-up real hits (he doesn't mention 50SOG, but it really springs to mind here). And this is indeed the world in which we live. Anita Elberse is basically condemning strategy number two, when she emphasizes why people producing content for theatrical release or network TV must absolutely go big or go home: faked up hits no longer work at all. The article frames it as long tail is a myth, but that's just a bad frame. Elberse and Anderson are 100% in agreement that the second kind of hit is dead and gone, and they may even agree on what killed it, altho they probably give that phenomenon different names.
"Another common question was whether the theory meant that obscure producers could now expect to get rich. Sadly it's not as simple as that." This would be the macrame jeans or Marcello Vena being all sad and thinking it is somehow Amazon's fault that his specialty catalog is not moving well. Macrame jeans and the Vena catalog can move at least a little in the long tail world, which is more than can be said for 3rd quarter of the 20th century (well, he's in Italy, and they've always been small firm, so *shrug*). But the long tail never said there would be a lot of customers for those jeans or those books -- just that the customers and producers could now actually find each other. Specifically, Anderson emphasizes that the businesses that benefit from exploitation of the long tail are customers (who experience greater choice) and aggregators (like Amazon) who can find margin in connecting customers and producers in the long tail. Producers in the long tail are going to stay poor. "For producers, Long Tail benefits are not primarily about direct revenues. Google Ad-sense on the average blog will generate risible returns, and the average band on MySpace probably won't sell enough CDs to pay back their recording costs, much less quit their day jobs." He goes on to point out other possible benefits of microcelebrity: you get a job, people come to your gigs, etc.
There are numerous places in the book where I went, hey, that's not quite right. In the main part of the book, he actually does a terrible job on the business models appropriate to the long tail (mostly by omission), and he makes some assumptions about cultural defaults (he mentions the 30 minute TV show, but he could have as easily identified the 300 page novel, or the 45 minute album, or wtf) being arbitrary and/or imposed by previous technology and therefore likely to go away. His advice on how companies should interact with bloggers is fairly iffy (altho if I had read this when it first came out, I probably wouldn't have noticed that, because I hadn't yet hit the point where authors/developers/wtf saying, Thank You! in the comments creeped me out yet). Using Bonnie McKee in the way that he does is especially hysterical, given what happened to her career in the years since the book was first published, and the career of the band which he uses as a contrast. Both the early success of the latter and the later success of the former say more about the ages of the performers and their natural audience than anything else, and the ultimate success of both of them does speak to the greater forgiveness of our music culture vs. the Days of Vinyl.
Speaking of which, I went on a little tirade a couple nights ago about how annoying it is when people talk about producer/performer trends in music without thinking about the installed music systems (tube vs. transistor, pre fuel crisis vinyl vs. post fuel crisis vinyl, 8 track's arrival in the studio, the compact cassette, etc.) of the purchasing audience. The music industry, believe it or not, is made up of a bunch of super savvy people. They recognize that the Art You Make Had Better Sound Good When It Gets Home. My example was, if everyone has vinyl systems with tubes on them, _of course_ you're going to get non-stop walls of violins. Duh. R. pointed out that AM radio tended to reinforce that as well. Once you have transistor systems, FM radio and hi-fi systems in general, you're going to get more exploration of deeper and more detailed bass, high-hat will actually survive, etc. All of which is simultaneously relevant (technology defines the limits of the possible, and not just in terms of connecting consumers and producers) and irrelevant (Anderson was focused on a particular piece of technology, the web-as-catalog).
One of the rules Anderson did supply in the book directly addressed gatekeeper decisions: put it all out there/don't choose for the customer. Let them choose. "Rule 7: Think "and," not "or." He gives examples like more colors, more retail channels, multiple endings to a movie on DVD, more subtitled languages, more screen options, more cuts for ratings. Also, "Rule 8: Trust the market to do your job." He makes a big deal about gatekeepers/pre-filtering vs. customer preference/post-filtering. It all sounds really great, and if it's versions of a blog post or whatever, and your readers are your friends, it is Teh Awesome. But we've seen with Kickstarter projects that forgiveness for problems in the V1 product does have some limits.
A while ago, someone had this great set of pictures titled, "Let's go to the Record Store." "Let's go to the Video Store." "Let's go to the Book Store." It was meant to show how music sales moved online, putting Tower etc. out of business, movies moved online, putting Blockbuster out of business and Amazon plus a financial crisis put Borders out of business and downsized Barnes & Noble extensively. It was brilliant -- I wish I'd saved the link -- because it also illustrated the high water mark of suburban big box media retailing which we may never attain again. You cannot seriously claim that The Long Tail (as a statistical description of the self-similar, powerlaw distribution of sales of any given kind of item) isn't real. If you do, you're innumerate, and that's okay. I don't make fun of the disabled because we all have our issues (I have more than many people do).
When people _do_ claim Hits Haven't Gone Away, well, they're right. Anderson maybe _hoped_ the hits would get smaller, and to the extent that hope seeped into the book (and at points, it really did), well, he's been disappointed, at least in terms of profit-making enterprises. But it's not clear that that was ever Anderson's focus. He's one of the lead sheep, unlike me, so he's really in it for the Cool, and the Discovery and cultural and reputational stuff like that. I'm a second rank sheep; I want to know how it's going to pay.
But those sheep back there, baaing along, claiming that the world is the same chopped off, hits only, no niche world of the 20th century?
Bwah ha ha ha ha.